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Forward Security for Hash-Based Signatures
Andreas Hu¨lsing
Department of Computer Science
TU Darmstadt
Digital signature schemes are one of the most used cryptographic primitives, with a wide range of
applications. The security of commonly used signature schemes is based on hard number theoretic
problems. However, no reduction of the security of these schemes to the underlying problems
is known. Furthermore, Shor showed that large quantum computers will be able to solve the
underlying problems in polynomial time and thus break all currently used signature schemes.
This motivates research on alternative signature schemes. One candidate scheme is the Merkle
Signature Scheme (MSS) ([1]). MSS uses a hash tree to authenticate many one time signature
scheme (OTS) instances using one public key. Using hash-based OTS schemes like the Winternitz-
OTS [1], the security of MSS can be reduced to standard properties of cryptographic hash functions,
an extensively studied primitive with non number theoretic implementations.
Furthermore MSS is a key evolving signature scheme meaning that the secret key changes
over time. One interesting property key evolving signature schemes can achieve is forward security,
formally defined in [2]. Informally a key evolving signature scheme is forward secure, if an adversary
gaining knowledge of the secret key at some point in time is not capable of forging a signature for
any secret key used before.
MSS is per construction forward secure, if the OTS key pairs are chosen at random and each
secret key is deleted directly after usage. But to reduce the key size of MSS to a practical value,
a pseudo-random generator (PRG) is used to generate the OTS key pairs. This construction
was studied by the authors of [4] and [3]. Both papers contain security reductions for certain
constructions. We revisit these reductions. Although mathematically correct, the assumptions in
both cases are problematic. The first one uses a construction, that undoes the benefit of using a
PRG as a large part of the OTS keys has to be stored initially. The other one, misses the formal
model of forward security as they do not release the whole secret key to the adversary during their
proof. We plan to construct a MSS variant with minimized key size that is provably forward secure
in the formal modell.
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Towards a mobile eCard Client
J. Buchmann, A. Wiesmaier∗, D. Hu¨hnlein∗∗, J. Braun, M. Horsch, F. Kiefer† and F. Strenzke††
∗ CASED ∗∗ ecsec GmbH † Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt †† Flexsecure GmbH
Darmstadt Michelau Darmstadt Darmstadt
Many future electronic identity cards will be equipped with a contact-less interface. Analysts expect
that a significant proportion of future mobile phones support Near Field Communication (NFC)
technology. Thus, it is a reasonable approach to use the cell phone as mobile smart card terminal,
which in particular supports the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) pro-
tocol to ensure user consent and to protect the wireless interface between the mobile phone and the
smart card. Other than existing efficient PACE implementations on low power devices we present
a platform independent solution using the Java Micro Edition (JavaME), which is supported by
almost all modern mobile phones. Based on a straightforward PACE [1] implementation, we apply
various optimizations realizable with existing JavaMe libraries to come up with a user friendly
performance.
Since point multiplication is one of the biggest run-time consumers in the PACE protocol, we ex-
amine the elliptic curve arithmetic of the available Cryptographic Service Providers (CSP). Bench-
marking [2] on PC and on the Nokia 6212 reveals the significant better performance of the Flexi-
Provider (FP) compared to Bouncy Castle which is the only other available CSP usable without
changes. Thus, we use FP for our implementation. For further optimization we review the most
common point multiplication algorithms and identify different possibilities for optimization, utiliz-
ing the advantages of the algorithms respectively. Merging different arithmetic operations of the
PACE protocol allows us to utilize interleaved point multiplication and thus, reducing the total
number of arithmetic operations. Furthermore we take advantage of different scalar lengths during
the protocol.
Saving the domain-parameters of the used eID card at first contact allows for static and dynamic
precomputations for subsequent program executions. Another optimization is changing the schedul-
ing of the calculations needed during the protocol. Additionally, threading allows to use the time
waiting for a response from the card or the user for further calculations. Further improvement is
reached by avoiding heavy Java objects (which are given by the libraries) and using primitive data
types and optimized data structures instead. We end up with a performance of 7.33 seconds on the
first execution and 6.31 seconds when using the eID card repeatedly on the Nokia 6212, whereas
the straightforward reference implementation achieves a total execution time of 9.5 seconds.
Additionally, we discuss potential side channel attacks and give advice on possible vulnerabilities.
The future work discussion shows that there is more optimization potential when making changes
to the existing CSPs.
All in all we succeeded in providing a platform independent efficient mobile PACE implementation
[3], and also showed where and how more efficiency could be gained, thereby preparing the way for
a mobile eCard client [4].
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A Hybrid Encryption Technique Supporting Expressive Policies
Stefan G. Weber
Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED)
Mornewegstrasse 32, 64293 Darmstadt, Germany
stefan.weber@cased.de
We sketch a novel hybrid encryption technique that supports expressive policies. It is hybrid, as
it combines ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [BSW07] with location-based
encryption (LBE) [SD03] on the level of symmetric keys. It enables encryption under expressive
policies, since it can efficiently handle attributes with continuous values, like location.
We use the following notation: EL
(P1,P2)
AP (M) denotes the encryption of a message M under a
logical conjunction of a CP-ABE attribute policy AP and a LBE location area attribute L(P1,P2).
Hereby, L(P1,P2) specifies an geographic area with the shape of an rectangle, defined by GPS coor-
dinates P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2). Finally, D
PR
{A}R
(CT ) denotes the decryption of a ciphertext
CT initiated by a receiver R, using his private attribute set {A}R, while being positioned at GPS
coordinate PR = (xR, yR). Decryption succeeds if R’s attribute set {A}R satisfies the attribute
policy AP and R is positioned within L(P1,P2), i.e. if x2 ≥ xR ≥ x1 and y2 ≥ yR ≥ y1 hold. It
employs a location lock mapping fLL(L
(P1,P2), according to the following principle: first, GPS co-
ordinates P1, P2 are concatenated. Second, the resulting string sLL(P1,P2) = x1||y1||x2||y2 is hashed,
h(sLL(P1,P2)), to a 128 bit string (assuming 128 bit symmetric keys), the location lock value. Our
hybrid encryption scheme works as follows: first, a random session key KeyS is generated. Second,
the message is symmetrically encrypted under KeyS, producing ciphertext CT1. Third, KeyS is
XORed with the location lock value, generating a hybrid key KeyH . Fourth, the output is con-
catenated with an encoding of the location area. Fifth, the resulting string is CP-AB encrypted
under an attribute policy AP , producing ciphertext CT2. CT1 concatenated with CT2 form the
ciphertext CT . Then, CT is transferred to a receiver R. The scheme for hydrid decryption works
as follows: first, receiver R tries to decrypt CT2, using his private attribute set {A}R. Second, on
successful decryption, the location area sLL(P1,P2) is extracted. Third, R’s current GPS position PR
is verified to be inside the location area by means of a tamper-resistant GPS receiver. On success,
the location lock value can be computed. It is then XORed with the recovered KeyH , in order to
reconstruct KeyS. Finally, KeyS is used to symmetrically decrypt CT1 to M .
We are currently working on applications of this techniques in the areas of end-to-end secure
attribute-based messaging [WRM10] and identity and access management [WMRM10].
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Compact Keys for Multivariate Cryptography
Albrecht Petzoldt1 and Stanislav Bulygin1
1 TU Darmstadt, CASED
Mornewegstrasse 32, 64293 Darmstadt, Germany
When quantum computers arrive, cryptosystems based on number theoretic problems such as
factoring or discrete logarithms will become insecure, since such problems can be efficiently solved
via Shor’s algorithm. So, to guarantee the security of communication in the post-quantum world,
alternatives to classical public key schemes are needed. Besides lattice-, code- and hash-based
cryptosystems, multivariate public key cryptography is one of the main approaches to achieve this
goal.
The basic idea behind multivariate cryptography is to choose a system Q of m quadratic poly-
nomials in n variables which can be easily inverted (central map). After that one chooses two
affine invertible maps S and T to hide the structure of the central map. The public key of the
cryptosystem is the composed quadratic map P = S ◦Q◦T which is difficult to invert. The private
key consists of S, Q and T and therefore allows to invert P.
Since they require only modest computational resources, multivariate schemes seem to be ap-
propriate for the use on low cost devices like RFID’s and smartcards. However, these schemes are
not yet widely used, mainly because of the large size of their public and private keys. Therefore,
the question of key size reduction for multivariate schemes is an important area of research.
The main topic of this talk is the reduction of the public key size of multivariate signature
schemes. After a short introduction into multivariate cryptography and an overview of the different
research activities in this field at CASED we present ways, how to create compact public keys for
multivariate schemes.
The public key P of multivariate schemes is given as a set of m quadratic polynomials in n
variables. After having chosen a monomial ordering, the coefficients of P can be written down into
an m× (n+1)·(n+2)2 matrix MP . Our goal is to create multivariate schemes in such a way, that the
corresponding coefficient matrix MP gets a compact structure.
Our first target here is the UOV signature scheme of Kipnis and Patarin, whose public key P is
given as the concatenation of the quadratic central map Q and an affine map T , i.e. P = Q◦T . We
show how, for a fixed matrix B and fixed affine map T , one can choose the coefficients of Q in such
a way that the coefficient matrix of the corresponding public key gets the form MP = (B|C). We
present several possibilities for the choice of B, e.g. choosing B partially circulant or B generated
by a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). By doing so, it is possible to reduce the public key
size of the UOV scheme by up to 86! Furthermore we show how this idea can be extended to other
(more advanced) multivariate signature schemes like Rainbow and enSTS, which reduces the public
key size by 62! Of course, the security is a crucial point for all of these schemes with reduced key
size . The talk finishes with some remarks about future research goals.
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Analysing XL and its variants
Enrico Thomae∗ and Christopher Wolf∗
∗Horst Go¨rtz Institute for IT-security
& Faculty of Mathematics
Ruhr-University of Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany
Solving systems of non-linear multivariate equations are at the heart of many cryptographic al-
gorithms, in particular in the public key setting. Usually, computing the Gro¨bner basis of the
corresponding ideal is the best choice in this context. The best known and also most efficient
algorithms for this task are F4 and F5. Another strategy to solve such systems is called eXtended
Linearization (XL). Using this rather simple folklore algorithm in cryptography was suggested by
Courtois et al. at Eurocrypt 2000 [1]. Unfortunately they did not provide a deep analysis of the
method and many claims showed to be overly ambiguous. At least since Courtois and Pieprzyk
claimed to have broken AES [2] using an XL derivate called XSL and the disproof by Cid and
Leurent [3] in 2005, the community of cryptographers became increasingly reserved against this
method. But thanks to Moh [4], Diem [5], Yang and Chen [6] and others, XL is understood quite
well today.
At Asiacrypt 2004 it was shown that XL actually is a sub-case of Gro¨bner algorithms and that we
hence can expect that Gro¨bner algorithms are always faster than XL [7, 5]. To improve XL and
maybe obtain a faster algorithm than F5 many derivates were proposed, such as FXL, XFL, XLF,
XL’, XL2, XSL and MutantXL.
We want to revisit the analysis of XL and adapt it on some of its variants. We are concerned about
the connection between these variants. Can one use them in parallel? Is some variant always better
than an other in some case? Many things can be evaluated only by experiments. Here, we want to
start understanding the theoretical background.
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Erfolgreiche Faktorisierungsangriffe gegen RSA in der Praxis
Juliane Kra¨mer, Benjamin Miche´le
TU Berlin / T-Labs
Ernst-Reuter-Platz 7
10587 Berlin
Seifert beschrieb 2005 einen neuen Fehler-Angriff gegen eine Implementierung der RSA-Signatur-
Verifikation [3]: Zuna¨chst wird der o¨ffentliche RSA-Modul N off-line modifiziert, indem zu den
letzten b Bits des Moduls bitweise zufa¨llige Fehlervektoren gleicher La¨nge addiert werden. Findet
sich unter diesen modifizierten N̂ ein Modul, der prim und teilerfremd zu dem o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨ssel
e ist, wird anschließend durch Fehlerinduktion in die Hardware genau dieser Modul erzeugt. Auf-
grund der Eigenschaften des manipulierten Moduls kann auf diese Weise die selbsterstellte Signatur
einer frei wa¨hlbaren Nachricht verifiziert werden. Muir verallgemeinerte diesen Angriff [2]. Zum
einen la¨sst er zusammenha¨ngende Fehlervektoren nicht nur bei den letzten Bits von N zu. Zum
anderen betrachtet er nicht nur prime N̂ , sondern allgemeiner solche, die leicht zu faktorisieren
sind. Muir konnte zeigen, dass dieser Angriff fu¨r 2048-Bit-RSA und einen 6-Bit-Fehlervektor eine
Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit von mehr als 50% hat.
Wa¨hrend der beschriebene Fehlerangriff Fehler-Induzierung in der Hardware erfordert, untersu-
chen wir die Mo¨glichkeit, den RSA-Modul durch einen Eingriff in die Software zu manipulieren: Wir
betrachten zusammenha¨ngende Teil-Bitfolgen des Moduls N verschiedener La¨nge und untersuchen
die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer leichten Faktorisierung mittels Probedivision und dem Miller-Rabin-
Test. Zusa¨tzlich wenden wir auf alle in Frage kommenden Teil-Bitfolgen eines gegebenen 2048-
Bit-RSA-Moduls diese Algorithmen tatsa¨chlich an und besta¨tigen damit die theoretischen Werte,
die auf einer Formel von Knuth beruhen [1]. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen ist ein praktisch
durchfu¨hrbarer Fehler-Angriff entstanden.
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A zero-knowledge identification scheme based on the q-ary Syndrome
Decoding problem
Pierre-Louis Cayrel1, Pascal Ve´ron2 and Sidi Mohamed El Yousfi Alaoui1
1 CASED 2IMATH
Mornewegstrasse 32, 64293 Darmstadt Universite´ du Sud Toulon-Var.
Germany France
Shor’s quantum algorithm for integer factorization, which was published in 1994, poses a serious
threat to most cryptographic systems in use today. In particular, all constructions whose security
relies on number theory (such as variants of the discrete logarithm problem or integer factorization)
are vulnerable to this algorithm. If quantum computers will at one point exist, such schemes can be
broken in polynomial time, whereas no quantum attacks are known for lattice-based, code-based,
and multivariate cryptographic systems. On the other hand, even should such number-theoretic
assumptions remain hard, it is not wise to rely on a single type of hard problems. Furthermore,
as the capacity of current adversaries increases, so does the key size for classical constructions; it
is possible that alternative post-quantum constructions may provide a better alternative in that
sense.
In this work, we consider a particular type of alternative cryptography, based on error-correcting
code theory. Code-based cryptography was initiated a long time ago with the celebrated McEliece
encryption algorithm. We consider the question of public key identification (ID) protocols in this
context. Such schemes allow a party holding a secret key to prove its identity to any other entity
holding the corresponding public key. The minimum security of such protocols should be that a
passive observer who sees the interaction should not then be able to perform his own interaction
and successfully impersonate the prover.
At CRYPTO’93, Stern proposed a 3-pass code-based identification scheme with a cheating proba-
bility of 2/3. In this work, we propose a 5-pass code-based protocol with a lower communication
complexity, allowing an impersonator to succeed with only a probability of 1/2. Furthermore, we
propose to use double-circulant construction in order to dramatically reduce the size of the public
key. The proposed scheme is zero-knowledge and relies on an NP-complete coding theory problem
(namely the q-ary Syndrome Decoding problem). The parameters we suggest for the instantia-
tion of this scheme take into account a recent study of (a generalization of) Stern’s information
set decoding algorithm, applicable to linear codes over arbitrary fields Fq; the public data of our
construction is then 4 Kbytes, whereas that of Stern’s scheme is 15 Kbytes for the same level of
security.
The improvement proposed here to the Stern scheme can be applied to all the Stern-based identi-
fication and signature schemes (such as identity-based identification and signature scheme [1] for
example). We believe that this type of scheme is a realistic alternative to the usual number theory
identification schemes in the case of constrained environments such as, for smart cards and for
applications like Pay-TV or vending machines.
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Quasi-dyadic CFS signatures
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Digital signatures are among the most useful and pervasive cryptographic primitives, either per se
or as part of more elaborate, derived protocols. Yet the overwhelming majority of actually deployed
signature schemes seem to rely on the hardness of certain computational problems that are efficiently
solvable by quantum computers [Sh95]. Should quantum computers become a technological reality,
the task of ensuring that suitable quantum-resistant signatures are available for deployment becomes
critical.
The signature algorithm proposed by Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier, or CFS for short [CFS01],
is one of the few and most promising schemes known based on the difficulty of decoding linear
error-correcting codes. However, it has the drawback that public keys tend to be exceedingly
large [FS09], all the more so due to an attack due to Bleichenbacher (unpublished, but described
in [FS09]).
Part of the difficulty resides in obtaining codes with high density of decodable syndromes, since
the CFS signing mechanism involves sampling random syndromes until a decodable one is found.
Essentially the only family of suitable codes for this purpose is that of binary Goppa codes, for
which one can actually correct all t design errors, leading to a signing complexity of O(t!). In
comparison, for other classes of codes, no decoding method is known that is capable of efficiently
correcting more than about half as many errors; since one has then to design the error correcting
capacity twice as high, the CFS signing complexity becomes O((2t)!) ≈ O((t!)2 · 4t/√t), far too
much for any secure parameter set.
Quasi-dyadic (QD) codes [MB09], which constitute a proper subfamily of Goppa codes, have
been proposed to address the problem of key reduction in the related McEliece and Niederreiter
cryptosystems. However, the original QD construction only yields codes with a fairly low density
of decodable syndromes, comparable to generic alternant codes rather than to other Goppa codes.
In our paper we modify the construction algorithm for t-error correcting quasi-dyadic codes
by [MB09], where the density of decodable syndromes is high, while also allowing for a reduction
by a factor up to t in the key size. This yields dense binary Goppa codes as needed for practical
instantiation of CFS signatures.
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In den letzten zehn Jahren ist der Bedarf an eingebetteten Systemen sehr stark gestiegen. Die In-
tegration von Field-Programmable-Gate-Arrays FPGAs in diesen Gera¨ten ermo¨glicht es, rechenin-
tensivere und komplexere Aufgaben auf Kleinstrechnern auszufu¨hren. Im Vergleich zu spezialisierten
Co-Prozessoren sind FPGAs durch ihre Rekonfigurierbarkeit flexibler und dennoch sehr effizient in
Bezug auf Rechenleistung und Stromverbrauch. Zusa¨tzlich sind die Entwicklungskosten von Funk-
tionsblo¨cken, so genannten IP-cores, auf FPGAs geringer als die Entwicklung eines spezialisierten
Prozessors mit der gleichen Funktionalita¨t. FPGAs werden auch zunehmend fu¨r sicherheitskritische
Applikationen auf eingebetteten Systemen interessanter, die viel Rechenleistung beno¨tigen. Sicher-
heitsmaßnahmen gegen Angriffe auf IP-Cores mit kryptographischen Operationen sind daher ein
elementarer Bestandteil bei der Entwicklung geha¨rteter, FPGA-basierter eingebetteter Systeme.
Diese Angriffe ko¨nnen analytischer Natur sein, aber auch Angriffe auf die Implementierung selbst.
Seitenkanalangriffe nutzen Schwachstellen in der Implementierung aus, um kryptographische
Algorithmen (z.B.) in eingebetteten System anzugreifen. Besonders die Powerattacken sind seit
1999 ein fundamentaler Bestandteil im Bereich der Seitenkanalangriffe. Vereinfacht ausgedru¨ckt,
besteht das Ziel dieser Angriffe darin, einen Zusammenhang zwischen dem datenabha¨ngigen Lei-
stungsverbrauch und dem geheimen Schlu¨ssel zu entdecken und auszunutzen.
In unserem Vortrag zeigen wir, wie die Kluft zwischen der Seitenkanalanalyse und dem Hardwa-
reentwurf bei sicherheitskritischen FPGA-Implementierungen geschlossen werden kann. Wir stellen
den so genannten stochastischen Ansatz vor, welcher stochastische Methoden verwendet, um den
deterministischen, schlu¨sselabha¨ngigen Leistungsverbrauch der kryptographischen Prozesse anhand
der Transitionsaktivita¨ten zu bestimmen. Mit Hilfe dieser Methode ko¨nnen mo¨gliche Schwachstel-
len in einem Design gezielt detektiert werden, um die u¨ber Seitenkana¨le ausnutzbaren Informa-
tionslo¨cher durch konstruktive Gegenmanahmen zu reduzieren, um eine Kompromittierung ge-
heimer Daten zu verhindern. Der stochatische Ansatz verbindet ingenieursma¨ßiger Expertise mit
fortgeschrittenen stochastischen Methoden aus dem Gebiet der multivariaten Statistik und kann
konstruktiv als Werkzeug unterstu¨tzend im Design-Prozess von gesicherten IP-Cores auf FPGAs
eingesetzt werden. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Analysemethoden, die ebenfalls den datenabha¨ngigen
Leistungsverbrauch ausnutzen, wie spa, dpa oder Template Attacken, zeichnet sich die vorgestell-




Der Kryptotag ist eine zentrale Aktivita¨t der GI-Fachgruppe Angewandte Kryptologie. Er ist eine
wissenschaftliche Veranstaltung im Bereich der Kryptologie und von der organisatorischen Arbeit
der Fachgruppe getrennt. Grundgedanke des Kryptotages ist, dass er inklusive Anreise wirklich
nur einen Tag dauert und Nachwuchswissenschaftlern, etablierten Forschern und Praktikern auf
dem Gebiet der Kryptologie die Mo¨glichkeit bieten, Kontakte u¨ber die eigene Universita¨t hinaus
zu knu¨pfen.
Die Vortra¨ge ko¨nnen ein breites Spektrum abdecken, von noch laufenden Projekten, die ggf.
erstmals einem breiteren Publikum vorgestellt werden, bis zu abgeschlossenen Forschungsarbeiten,
die zeitnah auch auf Konferenzen pra¨sentiert wurden bzw. werden sollen oder einen Schwerpunkt
der eigenen Diplomarbeit oder Dissertation bilden. Die eingereichten Abstracts werden gesammelt
und als technischer Bericht vero¨ffentlicht. Es handelt sich damit um eine zitierfa¨hige Arbeit. Sie
ko¨nnen von den Seiten der Fachgruppe herunter geladen werden.
Geplante Kryptotage
14. Kryptotag am 21. und 22. Ma¨rz 2011 Ruhr-Universita¨t Bochum, Horst Go¨rtz-Institut fu¨r
IT-Sicherheit. Kontakt: Christopher Wolf.
Bisherige Kryptotage
13. Kryptotag am 5. November 2010 Security Engineering Group, Technische Universita¨t Darm-
stadt & CASED. Kontakt: Andreas Peter.
12. Kryptotag am 9. April 2010 Institut fu¨r Kryptographie und Sicherheit, KIT. Kontakt: Willi
Geiselmann und Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade.
11. Kryptotag am 30. November 2009 Lehrstuhl fu¨r Informationssicherheit und Kryptographie,
Universita¨t Trier. Kontakt: Ralf Ku¨sters.
10. Kryptotag am 20. Ma¨rz 2009 Institut fu¨r Mathematik, Technische Universita¨t Berlin. Kon-
takt: Florian Heß.
9. Kryptotag am 10. November 2008 Institut fu¨r Internet-Sicherheit, Fachhochschule Gelsenkir-
chen. Kontakt: Markus Linnemann.
8. Kryptotag am 11. April 2008 Universita¨t Tu¨bingen, WSI fu¨r Informatik, Diskrete Mathematik.
Kontakt: Michael Beiter, Claudia Schmidt, Anja Korsten.
7. Kryptotag am 9. November 2007 Bonn-Aachen International Center for Information Techno-
logy. Kontakt: Michael Nu¨sken und Daniel Loebenberger.
6. Kryptotag am 19. Februar 2007. Universita¨t des Saarlandes, Information Security and Cryp-
tography Group und Sirrix AG. Kontakt: Michael Backes und Ammar Alkassar.
5. Kryptotag am 11. September 2006. Universita¨t Kassel, Fachbereich Mathematik/Informatik,
Theoretische Informatik. Kontakt: Heiko Stamer.
1. Kryptowochenende am 1. – 2. Juli 2006. Tagungszentrum Kloster Bronnbach der Universita¨t
Mannheim. Kontakt: Frederik Armknecht und Dirk Stegemann.
4. Kryptotag am 11. Mai 2006. Ruhr Universita¨t Bochum, Horst-Go¨rtz Institut. Kontakt: Ulrich
Greveler.
3. Kryptotag am 15. September 2005. Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt, Theoretische Informa-
tik. Kontakt: Ralf-Philipp Weinmann.
2. Kryptotag am 31. Ma¨rz 2005. Universita¨t Ulm, Abteilung fr Theoretische Informatik. Kontakt:
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Wolfgang Lindner und Christopher Wolf.
1. Kryptotag am 1. Dezember 2004. Universita¨t Mannheim, Theoretische Informatik. Kontakt:
Stefan Lucks und Christopher Wolf.
Innerhalb der Fachgruppe fu¨r Angewandte Kryptologie sind Stefan Lucks (Bauhaus Universita¨t
Weimar) und Frederik Armknecht (Universita¨t Mannheim) verantwortlich fu¨r die Organisation der
Kryptotage. Fu¨r eventuelle Ru¨ckfragen bitte an sie wenden.
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